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This article is for the voting citizens, the policymakers, the
innovators, and the believers who all understand that climate
change is an immense problem with numerous contributing
factors, requiring the search for a solution, one step at a time.
INTRODUCTION
California and Hawaii mandated that 100% of statewide energy
production come from a renewable resource by 2045.1 Twelve other states
have no mandated renewable energy targets at all, thereby allowing for a
continuance of the reliance upon traditional fossil fuels for consumer
demands.2 These opposed outlooks of future renewable energy standards
represent the fringes of statewide energy policies. The other thirty-six
states lie somewhere in the middle.
This dystopia of state-level energy policies results from numerous
influencing factors, which ultimately entrench national dependence on
fossil fuels and inhibit private economic action in the fight against climate
change. Varying degrees of regulation of utility companies is one factor,
while the presence of state-owned or investor-owned utility companies is
another. Also, deeply held connections between the fossil fuel industry and
state-level bureaucracy act to inhibit the adoption of progressive
renewable portfolio standards. Finally, legal grants of monopolistic power
to energy companies coupled with a lack of federal oversight and direction
further entrench the established norm.
As it stands, the progress towards fighting climate change at the
national level is in disarray,3 and there is a complete disunity of direction
and goals at the state level. This paper highlights the disunity by providing
a case study of the different regulations, which affect the solar power
* J.D. Pepperdine University School of Law 2019
1 National Conference of State Legislatures, State Renewable Portfolio
Standards and Goals, NCSL.ORG, (Feb. 1, 2019)
http://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/renewable-portfolio-standards.aspx.
2 See id. (Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, Tennessee, West Virginia, Wyoming).
3 Paris Agreement Under the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change, Nov. 4, 2016 U.N.T.S (The Paris Agreement signed by
Executive Agreement by President Obama) (Executive withdrawal by President
Trump, effective Nov. 4, 2020).
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industry across all fifty states, with a particular focus paid to net metering
regulations. Through an examination of this industry, three startling
conclusions will emerge. First, investor-owned utilities apply intense
political pressure through lobbying efforts to maintain the current status
quo of the utility industry’s economic model, which results in the
disfranchisement of average citizens from profitable “green” investments.
Second, because of lobbying pressure, states have adopted a myriad of
approaches towards net metering regulations, thereby creating uncertainty
affecting future solar investments. Third, in many instances, existing laws
bar investors’ recourse to the courts; it will take innovative judicial
challenges at the federal level to tackle future regulation. And fourth, the
battle between solar and utility industries over the future of energy
generation is just beginning, as solar storage laws are poised to be the next
major front of green regulation.
Section II of this regulatory exposé juxtaposes the traditional
utility economic model with the solar industry’s rise. Attention will be
directed to the special regulatory policies and initiatives that help guide
the rise in these competing industries. It will explore the initial success the
solar industry had regarding net metering laws, focusing particularly on
the early-adopting states, while also examining the laws that allowed the
utility companies to become the monopolistic behemoths they are today.
Section III examines the emerging clash between the solar and utility
industries. It will expose the coordinated response that emerged from the
utility lobby to overturn net metering legislation across the United States.
Section IV reviews how the lobbying efforts affected a change of
regulatory net metering policies on a state by state basis. Section V looks
at how shifting regulatory policies have affected solar investors,
particularly noting the uncertainty that follows net metering regulations,
which affect past, current, and future solar investments. Also, Section V
highlights the lack of judicial recourse for solar investors regarding the
regulatory policies that constantly alter the rates of returns that investors
can make off their solar installations. Section VI finishes with suggestions
for the utility industry going forward. First, it recommends a legal
challenge to the most drastic pro-utility net metering laws adopted in a few
states. Second, it identifies the key new solar storage regulations that will
be complementary to existing net metering regulations and recommends
their adoption in other states. Also, it previews how solar storage
regulations will be the new battleground for renewable energy adoption at
the state level.
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I.

SECTION I

(A) Utility Industry and Economic Model
Centralized energy distribution models—the standard for energy
distribution of the twenty-first century—remained largely unchanged
since Thomas Edison pioneered his utility company, General Electric, and
his central power plant design in 1882.4 Innovational and technological
advances—particularly under guidance from Samuel Insull at Chicago
Edison in the 1900s-1930s—helped cement the structure of the centralized
distribution model of energy for consumers.5 Simplistic in form and
structure, the model follows familiar economic terms such as “the spoke
and wheel.” First centralized power plants tapped natural resources at a
generation plant, which are then converted into electrical power.6 Utility
companies, who own, operate, and control the “grid” and control
transmission and distribution, then purchased this supply of energy.7
Power is distributed along the grid—flowing through numerous
transformers along power lines— and ultimately into the buildings of the
retail consumers.8
The entrenchment of the centralized distribution model and the
end pricing charged against consumers was as much an effect of
circumstance—the need for rapid proliferation of energy for American
consumption in the early 1900s—as it was of monopolistic policies.9 To
the former, between 1902 and 1930, the industry grew exponentially as
electricity prices fell year after year;10 consolidation of mass production
by producers supplied the growing mass consumption demand;11 rural
4 Edison’s Electric Light and Power System, ENGINEERING & TECH.
HIST. WIKI, https://ethw.org/Edison's_Electric_Light_and_Power_System (last
updated Jan. 24, 2018).
5 Samuel Insull American Utilities Magnate, ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Samuel-Insull (last updated
July 15, 2019).
6 Understanding the Grid, THE DEP’T OF ENERGY (Nov. 17, 2014),
https://www.energy.gov/articles/infographic-understanding-grid.
7 Id.
8 The Department of Energy, supra note 6, at 3.
9 Werner Troesken, Regime Change and Corruption. A History of
Public Utility Regulation, CORRUPTION & REFORM: LESSONS FROM AM.’S ECON.
HIST. at 267 (Mar. 2006) https://www.nber.org/chapters/c9986.pdf.
10 Id. at 261.
11 Id.
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electrification proliferated; and affordable energy became accessible to all.
However, for this to happen, substantial economic investments needed to
be made, which formed the basis of a natural economic monopoly.12
However, the natural economic monopoly was quickly subsidized in the
form of protected legal monopolies at the state and federal level.13
State public utility commissions (PUCs) were created at the turn of the
twentieth century and rapidly proliferated across the United States until
the 1940s.14 These commissions gave an exclusive franchise power to
utility companies—to serve a given geographical area for a fee—15
codifying the utility companies as not only natural economic monopolies,
but also as a legal monopoly.16
Federal support was also lent to these natural monopolies once
energy generation reached a point where it was being transmitted across
interstate lines. In 1935, the federal government asserted its control over
such sales in the Federal Power Act.17 This Act sought to provide checks
upon the growing state monopolies’ pricing system18 by stipulating that
the prices charged by utility companies be “just and reasonable.”19
However, jurisprudence of what is just and reasonable has been quite
deferential to the rate set by PUCs,20 and therefore inadvertently
entrenched the monopolistic growth of utility companies and ensured the
vertical integration system.21 Despite this effect, little else was done at the

12 Jim Chappelow, Natural Monopoly, INVESTOPEDIA FIN. DICTIONARY
(Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/natural_monopoly.asp.
A natural monopoly, like the name implies, is a monopoly that does not arise
due to collusion, consolidation or hostile takeovers. Instead, natural monopolies
occur when a company takes advantage of an industry’s high barriers to entry to
create a “moat” or protective wall around its operations. Id.
13 Troesken, supra note9, at 263–64.
14 Id. at 262.
15 Id. at 263–64.
16 Id. at 267–68.
17 Federal Power Act of 1935, 16 U.S.C. §§ 791(a)–828(c) (1935).
18 “It is declared that the business of transmitting and selling electric
energy for ultimate distribution to the public is affected with a public interest,
and that Federal regulation of matters relating to generation . . . is necessary in
the public interest . . . .” 16 U.S.C. § 824.
19 16 U.S.C. § 824 d (a).
20 See discussion infra Section IV(B).
21 Barry C. Lynn, America’s Monopolies are Holding Back the
Economy, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 22, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/02/antimonopoly-bigbusiness/514358/.
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federal level beyond “restructuring” the utility sector.22 The Energy Act of
1992 saw states’ “unbundle” electricity supply from transmission and
distribution, allowing nonutility generators to produce and sell power in
wholesale energy markets.23 While the introduction of wholesale and retail
competition, and the development of wholesale market institutions
effectively helped market forces replace regulation, it did little to
effectively break the monopoly or the vertical integration of the utility
industry.24
As it stands today, two types of utility companies dominate the
market—Investor Owned Utilities (IOUs) and Municipal Utilities
(MUs)—which contribute $284 billion to the U.S. economy annually.25
Roughly seventy percent of U.S. homes are powered by electricity
originating from investor-owned utilities.26 With corporate interests in
mind, IOUs are allowed, at a rate determined by the public utility company
that governs corporations, to earn a set profit on their investment. This
profit model is directly linked to its costs. In its most simplistic form, this
means the more an IOU spends, the higher its profit can be. However, this
system is far from simple, and rather it is filled with financial models
designed to profit the IOU and its shareholders, often at the expense of the
customers they serve. Since IOUs grow their profit base by deploying
capital, they have a natural bias towards making capital investments over
taking actions that minimize the total costs for its customers, a.k.a the
Averch Johnson effect.27 This directly derives from the Return on Equity
(ROE) model and largely contributes to market inefficiencies. For
example, fixed costs, such as investments into the grid, transmission lines,
and power generating plants are often taken to meet a “demand” that is not
22 GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ENERGY MARKETS:
CONCERTED ACTIONS NEEDED BY FERC TO CONFRONT CHALLENGES THAT
IMPEDE EFFECTIVE OVERSIGHT (June 14, 2002).
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 United States GDP From Utilities, TRADING ECON.,
https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/gdp-from-utilities (last visited Sept.
11, 2019).
26 Inara Scott, “Dancing Backward in High Heels”: Examining and
Addressing the Disparate Regulatory Treatment of Energy Efficiency and
Renewable Resources, 43 ENVTL. L. 255, 261 (2013).
27 James Tong & Jon Wellinghoff, Are Fixed Charges a Curse in
Disguise for Investor Owned Utilities, UTIL. DIVE (Mar. 25, 2015)
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/tong-and-wellinghoff-are-fixed-charges-acurse-in-disguise-for-investor-ow/378648/.
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necessarily there or to “upgrade” existing infrastructure unnecessarily.28
The more IOUs do this, the higher their potential rate of return they can
make.29 And the only check that keeps this system from spiraling out of
control is that this is still technically an investment risk, and IOUs have an
obligation to operate efficiently in order to earn that ROE. 30 The kicker
though, is that in order to recoup this investment, higher fixed charges are
tacked on to customers’ utility bills monthly. 31 With few competitors to
choose from in the market, customers can do little but pay these charges.
To the IOU, this model is fantastic because these fixed charges represent
a cost inefficiency somewhere in the point between generation,
transmission and distribution which again require more investment
(capital expenditures) to fix.32
Other costs are also calculated into the profitability model of
IOUs, namely salaries and energy purchases from generators. Because
utilities have a capped rate of return based directly off their capital
expenditures, IOUs can funnel excess cash into executive compensation
packages, an act which thereby increases the amount of profitability that
can be returned the following year. The same goes for purchasing energy.
It is in an IOUs interest to purchase large quantities of energy from
distributors via long-term power purchase contracts which increases the
overall capital expenditure of the company. The more money spent, the
higher the ROE that can be claimed for its shareholders. And so the cycle
continues.
With the vast sums of money at stake, it is understandable that
utilities sought to influence state-level policies towards favoring the
maintenance of their continued market dominance and profitability rates.33

Id.
See generally Scott, supra note 26, at 262–64 (Discussing how the
rate setting model which determines what utility companies can charge, is
directly dependent upon a utility’s Revenue Requirement, which is in turn based
on multiple factors discussed in the previous sentences).
30 See Tong & Wellinghoff, supra note 27.
31 Id.
32 See David Roberts, After Rising For 100 Years, Electricity Demand
is Flat and Utilities are Freaking Out, VOX (Feb. 27, 2018),
https://www.vox.com./energy-and-environment/2018/2/27/17052488/electricitydemand-utilities (noting that despite electricity sales becoming stagnant over the
last 11 years, Utility GDP growth has constantly increased).
33 See Ari Peskoe, Unjust Unreasonable and Unduly Discriminatory:
Electric Utility Rates and the Campaign Against Rooftop Solar, 11 TEX. J. OIL
GAS & ENERGY L. 211, 214–15 (Prices for utility distribution service are set
through regulatory proceedings before state public utility commissions (PUCs)”
and “[w]hile PUCs are now more involved in the details of rate design [omit]
28
29
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Almost uniformly, IOUs make up some of the largest campaign financiers,
political donors, and political lobbying groups across the fifty states. For
example, Florida Power & Light, one of the four largest IOUs in the state,
provides power to $4.8 million Floridians in 2015, which generated a
whopping $1.65 billion in profit that year.34 In the decade preceding that
year, in order to protect that profit, FPL and other IOUs contributed at least
$18 million to state politicians and political committees and $12 million
on lobbying.35 As well, in 2017, Florida IOUs conducted a $20 million
campaign to pass a ballot initiative seeking to ban third-party energy
suppliers from the state altogether.36
IOUs are not alone in seeking to maintain their continued
influence over the market. The fossil fuel industry is a big supporter, as
well. With the vertically integrated system of IOUs purchasing power from
centralized power plants, which derive the majority of their energy from
fossil fuels, the two industries are intimately connected. For example, the
Koch Brothers, investor magnates with enormous financial stakes in both
the utility and fossil fuel industry, have spent enormous sums seeking to
influence issues related to both industries. Koch Industries alone, separate
from the network of nonprofit organizations that also fund campaigns,
spent more than Exxon Mobile did in 2014 supporting fossil fuels.37
Simultaneously in the same year, the Koch funded group “Americans for
Prosperity” was an active participant in Georgia, Florida, and Kansas, in
support of existing utility structures over emerging renewable energy
structures.38

ratemaking continues to be a top-down process that begins with an IOU’s
proposed rates.”)
34 Tim Dickinson, The Koch Brothers’ Dirty War on Solar Power,
ROLLING STONE (Feb. 11, 2016), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politicsnews/the-koch-brothers-dirty-war-on-solar-power-193325/.
35 Id.
36 Julia Pyper, How Solar Scored a ‘Game-Chaning’ Victory in
Florida, GREEN TECH MEDIA (Apr. 25, 2018),
https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/how-solar-scored-a-gamechanging-victory-in-florida#gs.Y3g0WmDX.
37 Gideon Wiessman & Bret Fanshaw, Blocking the Sun 12: Utilities
and Fossil Fuel Interests That Are Undermining American Solar Power,
FRONTIER GROUP, at 13 (Oct. 2015),
https://environmentamericacenter.org/sites/environment/files/reports/EA_Blocki
ngtheSun_scrn_0.pdf.
38 Id. 13–14.
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Municipal Utilities (MUs), representing most of the remaining
thirty percent market share of utility providers, present a stark contrast to
IOUs. As a government-owned utility, most are established as nonprofit
entities that do not answer to shareholders.39 In this structure, they have
access to tax-exempt financing for their investments, they do not pay
federal income tax on their margins, and they generally compensate their
executives on par with government levels.40 Essentially, MUs take the
money IOUs pay in income taxes and profits to its shareholders and spend
it more outright on its customer base instead. This generally results in
providing cheaper residential electricity for its customers, while also
delivering more reliable service and faster restoration periods after power
failures.41
(B) Solar Industry and Economic Model
The growth of the solar industry in the United States has been
directly reliant upon technological innovation and decreasing costs of
production, government back subsidization of investments in solar, and
third-party market entrepreneurs.42 A brief history. The first solar cell was
built in 1954 and became commercially available in 1956.43 However, at
a cost of $300 per watt,44 and at a four percent energy conversion
efficiency rate,45 it was far beyond reach for mass adoption. Over the next
twenty years, the NASA space program spearheaded research and
development in the solar field, and NASA’s first practical use was to

39Diane Cardwell, Cities Weigh Taking Over From Private Utilities,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/14/business/energy-environment/citiesweigh-taking-electricity-business-from-private-utilities.html.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 John Rogers & Laura Wisland, Solar Power on the Rise, UNION OF
CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, at 5 (Aug. 2014),
https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2014/08/Solar-Power-on-theRise.pdf.
43 Victoria C., The History of Solar Power, EXPERIENCE (June 29,
2017), https://www.experience.com/advice/careers/ideas/the-history-of-solarpower/.
44 Id.
45 Luke Richardson, The History and Invention of Solar Panel
Technology, ENERGYSAGE (May 3, 2018), https://news.energysage.com/thehistory-and-invention-of-solar-panel-technology/.
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power satellites in space.46 By the 1970s, the cost per watt dropped to
twenty dollars, but such costs were still prohibitive and general solar
adoption was limited to government buildings, remote location power
production, and large corporations.47 This downward trend in cost
continued through the 1990s and into the 2000s until, almost fifty years
after its invention, solar became commercially viable for the average
consumer.48
Government backing was the second major incentive for the solar
industry’s advancement, and it has fit the conclusion that “[i]ncentives that
reduce the up-front cost of adoption and that are subject to low uncertainty
are found to have the largest impact [on solar adoption].” 49 The first major
push at the legislative scale came under the Carter administration. 50 In
1978, the Carter administration signed into law the Energy Tax Act to
“provide tax incentives for the production and conservation of energy.”51
This act created the first commercial and residential energy credit equating
to thirty percent of the first $2,000 investment and a twenty percent credit
on the next $8,000.52 The credit failed to have the desired effect53 and did
46 Id. In 1958, the Vanguard I satellite used a one-watt panel, and by
1964 NASA launched the first Nimbus spacecraft which was a fully selfsufficient satellite operating entirely on a 470-watt system. Id.
47 See Victoria C. supra, note 43.
48 See Richardson, supra, note 45 (“[T]he average individual home unit
installation cost has fallen year over year, dropping nearly 70% from 2010 to
2017, pre subsidation levels.”); see generally John Farrell, Solar PV Economies
of Scale Improve in 2010, INST. FOR LOC. SELF-RELIANCE (Sept. 15, 2011),
https://ilsr.org/solar-pv-economies-scale-improve-2010/ (discussing an in-depth
report of dropping solar rates from 2009-10).
49 Ilya Chernyakhovskiy, Solar PV Adoption in the United States: An
Empirical Investigation of State Policy Effectiveness, U. MASS. AMHERST
(Masters Thesis) (2015),
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&arti
cle=1097&context=masters_theses_2.
50 Energy Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 95–618, 92 Stat. 3174 (1978).
51 Id.
52 Energy Tax Act at 3175.
53 See The President’s Energy Program, Phase III: Hearings Before the
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 27–30 (1979)
(statement of Rep. Bill Frenzel) (“The principal tax credit bill we passed last
year does not seem to have given great incentive in the marketplace . . . The tax
credit does not motivate, but rather simply occurs at the end of the year when
the fellow finds there was a tax credit available. And I do not think that is a very
efficient and effective stimulus.”).
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not coincide with the widespread adoption of solar.54 The solar industry
continued its slow trudge towards mass adoption until 2005 when the Bush
administration reintroduced the solar residential tax credit and increased
the commercial tax credit.55 What was supposed to be a two-year tax credit
extended four times56 and is widely credited with assisting the solar
industry’s 1600% growth since 2005.57
Many state-level incentives accompanied the twelve-year period
of tax credits at the federal level. California, Nevada, Arizona, and Hawaii
all offered individual state tax benefits, in the form of tax credits, tax
deductions, sales tax exemptions, property tax exemptions, and net
metering benefits.58 These federal and state-level tax credits and subsidies
helped to reduce the average cost per installation unit (pre-incentives)
from $17,000 to about $12,000 in 2017. 59 This reduction in cost helps

54 Matthew Sabas, History of Solar Power, INST. FOR ENERGY RES.
(Feb. 18, 2016),
https://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/renewable/solar/history-of-solarpower/.
55 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109–58, 199 Stat. 594 (codified
as amended at 42 USCA § 15801 (2005)).
56 The tax credit was passed for a two-year period but was extended in
2006. Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109–432, 120 Stat. 2922.
This was again extended during the 2008 financial bailout package through
2016. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110–343, Div. A,
122 Stat. 3765. In 2015, the investment tax credit was extended once again,
although it iterated a phase-out of the tax credit by the year 2022. I.R.C. §
48(a)(5)(E)–(6)(B) (Supp. III 2015).
57 The Future of the Investment Tax Credit Under President Trump,
SULLIVAN SOLAR POWER (Nov. 30, 2016),
https://www.sullivansolarpower.com/about/news-and-events/industry-news/thefuture-of-the-investment-tax-credit-under-president-trump.html.
58 See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 73 (West 2019) (implementing
California property tax exemptions for installed solar systems, allowing business
and homeowners to exclude the added value of a system from the valuation of
their property for taxation purposes); ARIZ. REV. STAT. tit. 43 § 1083(a)–(b)
(LexisNexis 2019) (explaining that Arizona’s State solar tax credit grants 25%
of the total system cost, up to $1000); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 701B.005 (West
2019) (Nevada’s state rebate program for solar installation systems); N.J. REV.
STAT. tit. 54 § 54:32B-8.33 (2019) (New Jersey’s sales tax exemption). But see
Oklahoma – Energy Tax Credit, Solar Rebates and Incentives, DASOLAR
ENERGY, https://www.dasolar.com/energytaxcredit-rebates-grants/oklahoma
(last visited Jan. 28, 2019) (explaining that Oklahoma offers no Sales tax
exemptions, no property tax exemptions, no solar power performance payments,
no solar energy rebates).
59 Id.
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create a regulatory system to provide a return for a solar installation
investment, which has altogether driven solar adoption nationwide.60
The third market driver for solar adoption in the U.S. is the rise of
third-party investors allowing for innovative ownership structures.61 Many
companies, including solar manufacturers, offered financing methods for
homeowners principally in the form of leasing or power purchases
agreements.62 These structures often require little to no money down for
the homeowner and offer attractive fixed long term power purchase rates.63
Essentially, solar installers own the system, and the customer leases it and
pays off that lease by “buying” the electricity generated on-site at set rates.
These methods directly contribute to the mass adoption of solar by the
average consumer who otherwise is unable to afford the upfront
investment costs.64 It is so successful that a study of solar adoption in
leading solar states, Arizona, California, and New Jersey, found that
installations are overwhelmingly occurring in middle-class neighborhoods
with median household incomes ranging from $40,000 to $90,000.65
Despite all the market forces that drove solar adoption, current
solar production capacity is limited. Across the U.S., photovoltaic capacity
60 Alex Crees, Best and Worst Ranked States for Solar Industry
Growth, CHOOSE ENERGY (Jan. 30, 2018),
https://www.chooseenergy.com/news/article/best-and-worst-ranked-states-forsolar-industry-growth. While not conclusive on its own, it should be of little
surprise that Oklahoma, without such incentives, ranks among the worst U.S.
states for solar power with only 32 solar related companies, less than 700
residences powered by solar, and less than .01% of the states total electricity
coming from solar. Id.
61 See Rogers & Wisland supra, note 42.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Mari Hernandez, Solar Power to the People: The Rise of Rooftop
Solar Among the Middle Class, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Oct. 21, 2013, 9:07
AM),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/reports/2013/10/21/76013/solarpower-to-the-people-the-rise-of-rooftop-solar-among-the-middle-class/. The
reality of this development is staggering with Arizona Public Service databases
reporting 80% of solar power adoption in that state was from low to middle
income households, 67% for California, and 63% for Nevada. Id. In fact, nearly
83% of all solar investments in New Jersey, a solar energy leader, were
facilitated through leases or power purchase agreements. Third Party Solar
Financing, SEIA, https://www.seia.org/initiatives/third-party-solar-financing
(last visited Jan. 29, 2019).
65 See Hernandez supra, note 64.
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(both residential and commercial) sits at only sixty-six gigawatts, enough
to power 12 million homes.66 While this number is small on a macro level,
one cannot deny the economic benefits the emerging industry represents.
The U.S. solar industry, in 2017, generated $17 billion in investments and
had more than 10,000 companies active in the field.67 Those companies
combine to employ over 250,000 people in the United States and do so
across a range of technical skills requirements.68 Work in solar includes
installation, manufacturing, engineering, sales and marketing, finance,
project development, and much more.69 With its continued adoption, the
solar industry promises to employ thousands, if not millions more, across
the US.
II.
SECTION II
(A) The Rise of Net Metering
Considering the well-established centralized distribution of
energy model that governed utility companies for the last century, it should
be of no shock that the rise of solar would pose a market threat. It seemed
inevitable that as time elapsed the two energy industries would soon come
to conflict with one another. By the 1980s, solar innovation transformed
the idea of distributed generation of energy into an economic reality.70 In
1979, solar pioneer Steven Strong built a Department of Energy-funded
solar house that had the solar generating capacity to outproduce its
demand.71 The home was specifically engineered to feed the excess
production of power back to the utility company, and a small meter
installed with the home would indicate with an arrow, pointing forward or
backward respectively, whether the house was drawing energy from the
grid or feeding into it. 72 This simply became coined as net metering.

66 Solar Market Insight Report 2018 Year In Review, SEIA (Mar. 13,
2019), https://www.seia.org/research-resources/solar-market-insight-report2018-year-review.
67 Solar Industry Research Data, SEIA, https://www.seia.org/solarindustry-research-data (last visited Mar. 15, 2019).
68 This number is more than double the employment in 2012. Id.
69 National Solar Jobs Census, THE SOLAR FOUND.,
https://www.thesolarfoundation.org/national/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2019).
70 Roberto Verzola, Net energy metering opens the floodgates to solar
rooftops and other small-scale renewables (Mar. 17, 2015),
https://rverzola.wordpress.com/2015/03/17/1823/.
71 Id. (quoting BOB JOHNSTONE, SWITCHING TO SOLAR: WHAT WE CAN
LEARN FROM GERMANY’S SUCCESS IN HARNESSING CLEAN ENERGY 91 (2011)).
72 Id.
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As a concept, net metering followed the simplicity of the original
house built by Strong. Distributed generation, rising from solar and wind
generators, reverses the energy meter when supplying excess energy to the
grid.73 Conceptually, this meant that the one meter that measured
electricity in also measured electricity out.74 In reality, this meant that
“parity pricing” became the standard net metering model. 75 That is,
distributed generators receive payment for their generation at the same
rate, “the retail rate,” that they would pay for their consumption. 76
Ultimately, this was the standard formula that states and utility companies
themselves would adopt going forward.77
However, the adoption of net metering policies was far from
uniform across the fifty states. From Steven Strong’s net metering
experiment in 1979-2012, only forty of the fifty states adopted net
metering laws.78 Despite this though, by 2012, net metering laws were
intimately linked to solar adoption, and its effects were readily apparent;
ninety-nine% of all newly installed solar systems in the United States that
year were net-metered.79 Moreover, with this concerted action, it was
inevitable that an “equal and opposite reaction” would soon take place.
(B) Utility Company Pushback and the “Utility Death Spiral”
With the adoption of solar finally reaching a critical mass whereby
it had the potential to displace utility company profits by reducing load
demand, there was a concerted pushback from the utility companies
themselves. In 2012-13, The Edison Electric Institute (EEI), the utility
lobby, which represents IOUs, qualified distributed-generation and netmetering as a “disruptive technology” that could compete with utility
companies in the market of power distribution and thereby lead to
declining retail sales, loss of customers, and potential obsolescence. 80

Id.
Id.
75 Id. at 2.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 5.
78 Hiroko Tabuchi, Rooftop Solar Dims Under Pressure from Utility
Lobbyists, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/08/climate/rooftop-solar-panels-tax-creditsutility-companies-lobbying.html.
79 See Verzola, supra note 70, at 9.
80 Id.
73
74

2019

DISUNITY AMONG THE UNITED STATES

143

Thus, the utility industry initiated a coordinated effort to repeal, replace,
and render ineffective existing net metering laws.81
This effort centralized its focus on three arguments against net
metering across the United States. The first argument focused its attack on
the parity pricing model as stated by the EEI:
Because of the way that net metering policies originally
were designed, net-metered customers often are credited
for the power they sell to electric companies, usually at
the full retail electricity rate, even though it would cost
less for the companies to produce the electricity
themselves or to buy the power on the wholesale market
from other electricity providers.82
The second major argument that the utilities put forth focused on
the effect net metering had on the grid. It argued that solar equipped
homeowners, especially homeowners who net meter to the point where
they get credits from the utility company, get a free ride from the use of
the grid.83 Ultimately, this would shift grid maintenance costs to those who
do have net metering capacities and would thereby create economic
inequality among customers’ utility bills.84 Also, the marketability of this
argument increased when discovery displayed that solar adoption
primarily benefited the wealthy and that such adoption and continuance of
net metering policies would give the wealthy the market advantage, while
shifting grid maintenance costs to the poor who could not afford to install
solar systems.85

See Tabuchi, supra note 78.
Spread of Net Metering, & Utility Backlash – Net Metering History
Part 3, Clean Technica (Sept. 10, 2015),
https://cleantechnica.com/2015/09/10/spread-of-net-metering-utility-backlashnet-metering-history-logic-part-2/.
83 See Tabuchi, supra note 78.
84 Id.
85 See generally Monica Martinez, The Poor Shouldn’t Have to Bear
the Cost of Solar Power, FORBES (June 13, 2014),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/06/13/the-poor-shouldnt-have-tobear-the-cost-of-solar-power/#5060ea9ce322; Dan Way, Duke Energy:
Renewable Power Has Poor Subsidizing Wealthy, CAROLINA J., (Jan. 9, 2014),
https://www.carolinajournal.com/news-article/duke-energy-renewable-powerhas-poor-subsidizing-wealthy/ (outlining this cost shifting argument). But see
Hernandez, supra note 64 (the majority of solar adoption is from low to middle
income homes).
81
82
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While the credibility of the arguments is a constant source of
consternation for solar proponents,86 they had a significant legislative
effect upon net metering policies across the United States. Since 2013,
nearly every state with a net metering policy has undertaken a review of
their regulations; almost all states modified their approach towards it. With
actions ranging from eliminating net metering to maintaining the status
quo, the approach that the fifty states took regarding distributed
generations is anything but united. Instead, the distributed generation and
net metering policies across the fifty states represent a quagmire of diverse
political and economic agendas in the form of constantly shifting laws and
regulations. The next section of this market exposé will seek to wade
86 See Evaluation of Net Metering in Vermont Conducted Pursuant to
Act 125 of 2012, PUB. SERV. DEP’T, 6–28 (Jan. 15, 2013),
http://www.leg.state.vt.us/reports/2013ExternalReports/285580.pdf (evaluating
from a ratepayer standpoint if customers using net metering systems are
subsidized by other customers who do not employ net metering, it was
determined that non-solar customers benefit from net metering as the increase in
net-metering systems decreases the non-solar ratepayers costs of energy,
capacity, and transmission which directly contribute to the overall rate paid);
Lindsey Hallock & Rob Sargent, Shining Rewards The Value of Rooftop Solar
Power for Consumers and Society, THE FRONTIER GRP. (2015),
https://environmentamerica.org/sites/environment/files/reports/EA_shiningrewar
ds_print.pdf (reviewing 11 net metering studies that came, individually, to the
conclusion that the retail rate at net metering distributed generation is
compensated is actually undervalued in comparison to the benefits it provides,
thereby rebutting the attacks against the parity pricing model); Me. Pub. Util.
Comm’n, Maine Distributed Solar Valuation Study (Mar. 1, 2015),
https://www.nrcm.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/03/MPUCValueofSolarReport.p
df (finding that non-solar ratepayers derive a substantial benefit from distributed
generation in that the distributed energy sold saves the non-solar ratepayer in the
form of electricity costs by displacing costs normally calculated into energy
costs supplied by the utility company including purchasing energy from more
expensive power sources, reduced transmission costs on the electric grid system,
reduced future investment costs to build more centralized power plants to meet
peak demand, and the stabilization of energy prices at peak periods); Nevada
Net Energy Metering Impacts Evaluation, ENERGY & ENVTL. ECON., INC., 6–7
(July 2014),
http://puc.nv.gov/uploadedFiles/pucnvgov/Content/About/Media_Outreach/Ann
ouncements/Announcements/E3%20PUCN%20NEM%20Report%202014.pdf?
pdf=Net-Metering-Study (determining that the impact Net Metering policies and
distributed generation benefits had from 2004-2016 upon non-solar participants
was a $36 million dollar savings and that after net metering regulation changes
in 2016, the cost-shifting towards non-solar participants would be negligible).
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through these competing approaches and to bring a sense of understanding
for those trying to make educated decisions regarding future investments.
III.

SECTION III

(A) Arkansas
The Arkansas Renewable Energy Development Act of 2001 made
Arkansas one of the early adopters of net metering regulation.87 However,
by 2017, adoption by net metering customers had not taken off with only
500 net metering customer’s in the state.88 This undoubtedly is a
correlation to the law banning third-party investors from participating in
net metering adoption,89 which as stated in Section II(B) supra, was one
of the primary drivers of solar adoption. However, this relatively low
adoption did not deter the utility lobby from presenting its arguments to
the Arkansas Legislature.90 The effect that these arguments had was
readily apparent as the Arkansas Public Utilities Commission’s working
groups on net metering became divided along ideological lines, with one
working group advocating a change to the retail parity pricing module and
another recommending a continuation of the parity pricing status quo. 91
New legislation soon followed that sent a mixed signal.92 In the first
instance, legislation in 2017 grandfathered existing retail rates for existing
net metering customers statewide.93 However, for new solar installation
investors, a new pricing module was established. The new module had four
major components. First, the Arkansas Public Utility Commission

87 Kyle Massey, Private solar’s future In Arkansas hinges on review,
WASH. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2016),
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/oct/23/private-solars-future-inarkansas-hinges-on-review/.
88 Id.
89 Fran Alexander, Opinion, Let Arkansas Shine, ARK. DEMOCRAT
GAZETTE (Feb. 19, 2019),
https://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2019/feb/19/fran-alexander-let-arkansasshine-20190/?opinion.
90 Id.
91 Robert Walton, Arkansas net metering working group fails to reach
consensus, UTILITY DIVE (Sept. 19, 2017),
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/arkansas-net-metering-working-group-failsto-reach-consensus/505203/.
92 Id.
93 Id.
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(APUC) adopted aggregate94 net metering.95 Second, the APUC replaced
retail parity pricing with an “avoided cost” pricing system.96 Third,
Arkansas implemented indefinite carry-over periods for positive net
metering.97 And fourth, Arkansas implemented a residential net metering
cap of 25kW or 100% of the net metering customer’s highest monthly
usage in the previous twelve months of residential use, whichever is
greater.98 Currently, as we stand today, the Arkansas Senate has proposed
Bill 145, which seeks to eliminate the ban of third-party solar investments
in the state.99
(B) California
California has unquestionably been the leading state for
distributed generation and net metering adoption.100 California’s first net
metering policy followed the Parity Pricing Retail rate model but
implemented a distributed generation cap of five percent of total peak
electricity demand for its investor owned utilities (IOUs).101 However,
utility lobbying in California also had an effect and in 2016, the California
Public Utilities Commission approved Decision (D.) 16-01-044, which
aimed to continue the net metering structure while also making
adjustments to align the costs of new net metering customers with those of
non-metering customers.102 However, with the widespread adoption of
solar, California’s IOUs quickly reached their five percent cap by 2015,
and California adopted its next-generation program known as Net

94 “‘Aggregate net metering’ is a modification to net metering that . . .
allow[s] electric customers to offset energy use at all meters or buildings with
solar at any meter or building.” John Farrell, Aggregate Net Metering, INST. FOR
LOC. SELF-RELIANCE (June 5, 2015), https://ilsr.org/aggregate-net-metering/.
95 Net-Metering Rules, Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 2-1/2 (Sept. 15,
2017), http://www.apscservices.info/Rules/net_metering_rules.pdf.
96 Id. at 2-2.
97 Id.
98 Id. at B-1.
99 See Alexander, supra note 89.
100 Sara Matasci, Explaining Net Metering 2.0 in California,
ENERGYSAGE (Jan. 2, 2019), https://news.energysage.com/net-metering-2-0-incalifornia-everything-you-need-to-know/.
101 Id.
102 Net Energy Rule Making (R.) 14-07-002, Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n,
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/General.aspx?id=3934 (accessed on Mar. 09, 2018).
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Metering 2.0.103 Four features classify this new structure.104 First, previous
net metering systems are grandfathered in at the retail rate for 20 years.105
Second, new solar installations parity pricing module was replaced with a
“Time of Use”106 compensation rate.107 Third, utility companies are
allowed to charge a one-time interconnection fee to connect new solar
panels to the electric grid.108 And fourth, distributed generation systems
would have to pay non-bypassable charges to the utility company for
energy bought from the company, which they did not have to
previously.109
(C) Colorado
Colorado was another early net metering adopter; although
uniquely, net metering resulted from a mandate through a public ballot
initiative approved by Colorado voters in 2004.110 Since then it has been a
pioneer in offering various new forms of eligibility for net metering
systems including aggregate net metering, community solar gardens, and
now Solar-Plus-Storage systems.111 As of December 2018, the Colorado
net metering regulatory landscape looks as follows: first, there is a
distributed generation system cap of 120% of a customer’s average annual
consumption, allowing for varying system caps based upon a customer’s
needs.112 Second, distributed generation customers who become net
See Matasci, supra note 100.
Id.
105 Id.
106 “In a [Time of Use] rate structure, the cost of electricity varies
throughout the day based on electricity demand. The highest electricity prices
come in the afternoon and evening, when air conditioners are running at top
speed and customers are returning home from work. Solar system owners on
TOU rates still receive a credit worth the cost of one kWh for every kWh they
generate. However, because the rate changes throughout the day, the value of
net metering credits is also variable. One kWh of solar electricity sent back to
the grid at 10 am, during ‘off peak’ hours, will be worth less than a kWh sent
back to the grid in the afternoon and evening ‘peak’ hours.” Sara Matasci, Solar
and time-of-use electricity rates: what you need to know, ENERGYSAGE (July 27,
2017), https://news.energysage.com/solar-time-use-electricity-rates-need-know/.
107 See Matasci, supra note 101.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Colorado Net Metering, DSIRE,
http://programs.dsireusa.org/system/program/detail/271 (last updated Nov. 30,
2018).
111 Id.
112 Id.
103
104
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exporters are compensated with monthly carry-over credits at a 1:1 ratio
of kW hours produced.113 After a year, customers can choose to carry over
their production indefinitely or receive cash compensation at the utilities
average hourly incremental cost of the preceding calendar year.114
Moreover, distributed generation producers are eligible to receive
renewable energy credits, which can be sold to public utility companies.115
All in all, Colorado is a pioneer in energy storage, and Governor
Hickenlooper declared solar storage as an energy right for Colorado’s
constituents.116
(D) Connecticut
In Connecticut, the utility lobby successfully implemented its
anti-net metering agenda.117 The state legislature passed one of the most
retrogressive net metering policies in the country in 2018.118 First, existing
net metering customers are grandfathered in for the next twenty years, and
new net metering opportunities are not open to new customers.119 Second,
new distributed generation systems are compensated either in a “buy
all/sell all” format120 or in an excess production over a specified period
format.121 The former mandates that utility companies purchase all energy
generated by customers at a wholesale rate, regardless of the amount
generated, and then sell all of the energy needed by those same customers
back to them at a retail rate, effectively prohibiting customers from
utilizing their own generated energy.122 The alternative format allows for
distributed generators to consume their own power and sell their excess
power back to utility companies, but only if that excess is produced during
a specified period set by public utility companies.123

Id.
Id.
115 Id.
116 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-2-130 (2018).
117 Stephen Pelton, Eliminating net metering was a huge step
backward, CT Mirror (Jan. 17, 2019), https://ctmirror.org/category/ctviewpoints/eliminating-net-metering-is-a-huge-step-backward/.
118 S. B. 9, Conn. Gen. Assemb. (2018).
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 See Pelton, supra note 117.
123 Id.
113
114
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(E) Hawaii
Hawaii was initially a pioneer in net metering adoption. In 2001,
the state implemented its retail rate net metering regulation.124 This retail
rate, in addition to Hawaii’s high energy costs because fossil fuels for
energy needed to ship to Hawaii’s local power generators, which made
Hawaii one of the most expensive states for electricity, created a push for
widespread distributed generation adoption. Ultimately, it reached sixteen
percent penetration on some islands.125 However, Hawaii’s regulation is
an interesting cautionary tale of what can happen when rapid net metering
adoption takes place.126 In 2015, Hawaii succumbed to lobbying from
IOUs and shut down the net metering program completely. Two interim
systems replaced the net metering program. First, in high solar penetration
areas, solar customers were able to continue sending energy back to the
grid, without receiving any compensation for their exports.127 In non-high
solar penetration areas, distributed generators were compensated for their
exports at a wholesale rate, while simultaneously paying a $25 monthly
grid connection cost to the IOU. These interim systems were replaced in
2018 by two new tariffs, which accompanied the adoption of solar-storage
systems. Hawaii now has a Customer Grid Supply Plus tariff, which is a
first-come-first-serve rate for residential and small commercial systems
with a region-specific capacity limit. 128 This system credits customers at a
variable rate by island and with ultimate control of the output from
distributed generation systems controlled by utility companies. The other
system, the Smart Export tariff, posits excess generation to an on-site
battery system during daylight hours with the discharge of that stored
electricity to happen during the evening.129 Excess electricity exported to
the grid in the evening, overnight, and early morning receives a credit,
124 Eric Wesoff, Rooftop Solar in Oahu Crashes with Loss of Net
Metering, Lack of Self-Supply Installs, GREEN TECH MEDIA (Feb. 7, 2017),
https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/rooftop-solar-in-hawaii-crasheswith-loss-of-net-metering-lack-self-supply#gs.IakcyOOA.
125 Id.
126 Id. (“Hawaii has an unprecedented amount of DG PV feeding into
[their] isolated island grids . . . There are limits to what today’s grids can
accommodate . . . Even if surplus power does not feed back into the grid, . . .
there are limits as to just how low combustion generators can be ramped
down.”).
127 Id.
128 Hawaii Distributed Generation Tariffs, DSIRE,
http://programs.dsireusa.org/system/program/detail/596 (last updated Nov. 28,
2018).
129 Id.
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again at a variable rate by island.130 Furthermore, regardless of the tariff,
there is a 100 kW system capacity limit on three of Hawaii’s islands and a
50 kW limit on the Fourth of July. 131
(F) Indiana
Indiana is another state which has acquiesced to arguments put
forth by the utility lobby, 132 despite the fact that Indiana Power & Light,
one of Indiana’s IOUs, had only 100 solar generation customers.133 Indiana
passed legislation to ultimately phase out net metering from the state. 134
Currently, Indiana’s net metering regulatory climate consists of three
regressive policies. First, a grandfather clause for existing net metering
customers.135 Second, the retail rate credit is replaced with a wholesaleplus-premium credit, effectively replacing the eleven cents per kW charge
with a four cents per kWh charge.136 Third, a statewide 1.5% peak summer
load distributed generation cap is also implemented.137
(G) Florida
Florida has a mixed history with net metering. It was a late state
adopter, only establishing its own net metering regulations in 2008. The
regulation initially implemented a parity pricing compensation system, but
it simultaneously charged customers both “customer charges” and
“demand charges” regardless of whether excess energy is delivered to the
utility company.138 Other familiar models were present in the 2008
regulations. First, there is a 10 kW residential system cap as well as an
IOU system generating cap limited to 115% of the household’s monthly
Id.
Id.
132 See Tabuchi, supra note 78, (“[A] group of utility lobbyists
descended on the statehouse, handing out talking points that said credits for
rooftop solar panels lead to higher rates for everyone else. They were there to
support a bill . . . that would roll back Indiana’s net metering system by reducing
the rate utilities paid to solar consumers for their excess electricity.”).
133 Robert Walton, Indiana Will Phase Out Retail Rate Net Metering,
UTILITY DIVE (May 4, 2017), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/indiana-willphase-out-retail-rate-net-metering/441932/.
134 Id.
135 Burns Ind. Code Ann. § 8-1-40-14
136 Burns Ind. Code Ann. § 8-1-40-18; Walton supra, note 133.
137 Burns Ind. Code Ann. § 8-1-40-10.
138 Docket No. 070674-EI; PSC-08-0161-FOF-EI (3) (2008).
130
131
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kW usage.139 Second, excess credits at the end of each annual billing cycle
are payment claimable by the distributed generator customer at the
Avoided Cost rate.140 Third, application fees are required, ranging from
$400 to $1000, for distributed generator systems with a capacity over
between 10kW and 2000kW.141 And fourth, there is no state-wide net
metering cap.142 However, Florida has long locked out third-party solar
investments, thereby crippling adoption.143 This position was recently
reversed in 2018, albeit the new legal requirements for third-party
participation is far from clear.144
(H) Maine
Maine’s net metering regulatory landscape can be described as
tumultuous at best. IOU lobbying had a great effect, and in 2017, Maine
discarded its net metering laws and adopted the first buy all/sell all pricing
system in the United States.145 To implement this system, Maine adopted
a “gross metering” on-site system requirement that required expensive
initial investments born by distributed generators so that the Maine
government measured net metering production.146 However, this system
proved disastrous, cost ratepayers as much as $3,300 per installation. 147
over the next year, and has been slowly dismantled.148 The gross metering
requirement was repealed for medium and large size distributed
Id.
Id. at (8)e-f.
141 Id. at 4(f).
142 See generally Docket No. 070674-EI; PSC-08-0161-FOF-EI (no
statewide cap).
143 See Pyper supra, note 36.
144 Id. (Florida’s reversal on third-party participation still bans the sale
of electricity from third-party providers, thereby forcing companies like Sunrun
to alter their power purchase agreements to become a true equipment leasing
agreement rather than a contract for energy agreement.)
145 Distributed Generation Buy-All Sell-All Program, ENERGY.GOV,
https://www.energy.gov/savings/distributed-generation-buy-all-sell-all-program
(accessed Mar. 6, 2019).
146 Christian Roselund, Maine Regulators Reverse Gross Metering
Decision for Mid-sized Large Customers, PV-Magainze (Dec. 12, 2018),
https://pv-magazine-usa.com/2018/12/12/maine-regulators-reverse-grossmetering-decision-for-mid-sized-large-customers/.
147 Id.
148 Maine PUC Stops Tax on Medium & Large Customers Using Their
Own Power, NAT. RESOURCES COUNCIL OF MAINE (Dec. 12, 2018),
https://www.nrcm.org/maine-environmental-news/maine-puc-stops-taxmedium-large-customers-using-own-solar-power/.
139
140
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generators,149 and the Maine legislature is currently considering a bill to
eliminate the gross metering requirement for all system sizes going
forward.150
(I) Mississippi
Mississippi’s net Metering regulatory landscape has been directly
affected by utility lobbying efforts. A late-comer to the solar game,
Mississippi’s regulatory actions regarding net metering epitomize the
conflict between solar advocates and utility companies, despite the fact
that Mississippi had little to no net metering projects at that time.151 In
2014, the Mississippi commission released a study that agreed with the
solar advocates’ position that net metering posed a benefit for Mississippi
customers.152 However, the state’s utility regulators deviated from the
report’s recommendation and instead sought to implement a compromise
between solar advocates’ compensation request of ten cents per kilowatthour generated and utility companies’ request of 4 to 4.5 cents per
kilowatt-hour generated (the wholesale rate).153 Finding a middle ground,
Mississippi credited customers at the wholesale electricity rate (the
avoided cost rate) plus 2.5 cents per kilowatt-hour, averaging to about 7 to
7.5 cents per kilowatt-hour.154 Second, Mississippi sought to incentivize
low-income adoption by creating an additional two cents per kilowatt-hour
for the first 1000 customers (per the two IOUs) that installed distributed

See Roselund, supra, note 146.
Betsy Lillian, Maine Legislature Holding Public Hearing on Bill to
Repeal Gross Metering, SOLAR INDUSTRY (Jan. 29, 2019),
https://solarindustrymag.com/maine-legislature-holding-public-hearing-on-billto-repeal-gross-metering/.
151 Julia Pyper, Mississippi Regulators Strive for Compromise with New
Net Metering Rule, GREENTECH MEDIA (Dec. 07, 2015),
https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/mississippi-regulators-strive-forcompromise-with-new-net-metering-rule#gs.1196lf.
152 See generally Stanton ET AL., Net Metering in Mississippi Costs,
Benefits, and Policy Considerations 2, 3 (Sept. 19, 2014), http://www.synapseenergy.com/sites/default/files/Net%20Metering%20in%20Mississippi.pdf.
153 See Pyper, supra note 151.
154 CMSR 39-000-004(II)03-106; Mississippi Public Service
Commission Schedule No. 59 (Sept. 18, 2016),
https://www.mississippipower.com/content/dam/mississippipower/pdfs/business/pricing-and-rates/special-application-rates/RENM.pdf.
149
150
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generation projects.155 Third, the state has a three percent statewide net
metering cap and a 20kW residential system cap.156 What is perhaps most
interesting about Mississippi’s regulatory field is not the unsurprising fact
that it has led to slow adoption of distributed generation customers, but
rather that the Public Service Commission is now overdue on its mandated
compensation review, which was to happen on or before January 2019.157
Considering that adoption was slow, one can only query why the rate
compensation scheme did not reach an equilibrium in its compromise but
rather reached a decision that maintained the status quo for the utility
industry.
(J) Nevada
Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid once described Nevada as the
“Saudi Arabia of solar energy.”158 For a long time, Nevada held up that
high praise as a pioneer in the solar industry. However, in 2014, the
Nevada Public Utilities Commission, bowing to pressure from utility
companies, adopted a retrogressive net metering pricing model. The model
replaced the retail parity pricing structure with a declining model that
bottomed out at the wholesale rate of electricity159 and added an additional
three-part rate for distributed generation services including a monthly
service charge, a demand charge, and an energy charge.160 This new model
had no grandfather clause and applied retroactively to all 17,000 existing
solar customers.161 Under the 2015 regime, solar providers left the state
almost instantly, and the solar industry laid off hundreds of individuals
from their jobs.162 However, economics and voter backlash resulted in the
Id.
CMSR 39-000-004(II)03-101-02.
157 Id. See Mississippi Public Service Commission Schedule No. 59,
supra note 133. Without this review, the 2.5 cent compensation buffer became
optional for utility companies to pay as of January 3, 2019.
158 See Dickinson supra, note 34.
159 Julia Pyper, Nevada Regulators Eliminate Retail Rate Net Metering
for New and Existing Solar Customers, GREENTECH MEDIA (Dec. 23, 2015),
https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/Nevada-Regulators-EliminateRetail-Rate-Net-Metering-for-New-and-Existing-S#gs.XRpklExz.
160 Application of Nevada Power Company: Before the Public Utilities
Commission of Nevada, No. 15-07042 at 55 (Dec. 21, 2015, 8:27 AM),
http://pucweb1.state.nv.us/PDF/AxImages/DOCKETS_2015_THRU_PRESEN
T/2015-7/8305.pdf
161 See Dickinson, supra note 34.
162 Jan Ellen Spiegel, In Northeast net metering in flux as states look to
reform solar policy, ENERGY NEWS NETWORK (July 17, 2018),
155
156
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restoration of Nevada’s pro-net metering outlook. In 2017, the Public
Utilities Commission of Nevada set forth new net metering guidelines.
Under the new regime, compensation for excess generation is credited at
ninety-five percent of the retail electricity rate.163 Furthermore,
compensation is paid for the net excess of electricity sent back to the utility
on a monthly basis rather than on a kW per hour basis. 164 Under the new
net-metering laws, Nevada reestablished itself as a force in the net
metering industry. While there were only 287 net metering applications in
2016, under the 2015 regime, there were 3,200 applications the following
year after the new net metering legislation was implemented.165
(K) New Jersey
New Jersey has long been at the forefront of the renewable energy
adoption, and despite utility-funded campaign efforts, New Jersey stands
out among the pack with one of the most progressive renewable portfolio
standards in the nation.166 In seeking to meet New Jersey’s advanced 2050
goals, it is unsurprising that net metering became a major focus of the
current energy portfolio in the state. In New Jersey, four major features
define the net metering agenda. First, distributed generation customers are
credited at the full retail rate for their monthly excess generation. 167
Second, distributed generation customers do not have a system capacity
size limit on their installations, although the system generation cannot

https://energynews.us/2018/07/17/northeast/in-northeast-net-metering-in-fluxas-states-look-to-reform-solar-policy/.
163 Julia Pyper, Nevada PUC Approves Net Metering Rules Expected to
Reboot the State’s Rooftop Solar Industry, (Sept. 5, 2017),
https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/nevada-puc-approves-netmetering-rules-expected-to-reboot-the-rooftop-solar#gs.pFNzj1jv.
164 Id.
165 John Weaver, Net Metering Drives Rooftop Solar Resurgence in
Nevada, PV-MAGAZINE (May 7, 2018), https://pv-magazineusa.com/2018/05/07/net-metering-in-nevada-once-again-shown-as-solar-powerwinner/.
166 See State of New Jersey Assembly Bill No. 3723 (218th legislature)
(signed into law May 23, 2018) (The 2019 Energy Master Plan, adopted by NJ
Gov. Phil Murphy, both accepted as a truth that humans are the leading drivers
of climate change and mandated a conversion of the State’s energy production
profile to be 100% clean by 2050).
167 N.J.A.C. 14:8-4.3(l).
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exceed annual electric consumption on-site.168 Third, monthly credits
carry over169 and the annual excess generation,170 leftover credits at the
end of an annual billing cycle, are paid out to distributed generators at the
avoided cost rate i.e. wholesale.171 These three features represent a gold
standard for new generation net metering laws. The fourth feature of the
New Jersey Model is a state-wide net metering cap with a 2.9% of state
annual sales of electricity.172
(L) New York
New York responded quite uniquely to lobbying from the utility
industry. Initially, like most states, New York had a standard retail
compensation scheme for distributed generation.173 It also had a state net
metering cap that started at one percent, was increased to three percent,
and then doubled to six percent.174 However, in 2017, in response to utility
concerns, New York transitioned its scheme from the standard net
metering model to a compensation model called the Value of Distributed
Energy Resource (“VDER”).175 This new model is arguably the most
complex compensation model in the United States, as it accounts for a
series of considerations while demanding “fair and accurate compensation

N.J.A.C. 14:8-4.3(a).
N.J.A.C. 14:8-4.3(d).
170 Note: this is different from annual generation in that the annual
system generation cap is measured against a previous 12-month energy supply
period. Thus, excess generation can be greater than consumption but still less
than the previous annual system generation cap.
171 N.J.A.C. 14:8-4.3(e).
172 Id.; New Jersey Net Metering, DSIRE (Nov. 16, 2018),
https://programs.dsireusa.org/system/program/detail/38. But see New Jersey
Senate Bill 2018-S592, LEGISSCAN (Jan. 2018),
https://legiscan.com/NJ/text/S592/id/1685055 (proposing to increase New Jersey
net metering cap to 5.8%).
173 David G. Schieren, New York Solar Net-Metering is Under Attack,
SUNPOWER (Nov. 10, 2017), https://www.empower-solar.com/blog/ourresponse-to-net-metering-changes.
174 New York Net Metering, ENERGY.GOV,
https://www.energy.gov/savings/net-metering-23 (last accessed Mar. 9, 2019);
New York Net Metering, DSIRE (Jan. 5, 2019),
https://programs.dsireusa.org/system/program/detail/453.
175 Kerry Thoubborn, VDER: NY’s Replacement to Net Metering,
ENERGYSAGE (Dec. 20, 2018), https://news.energysage.com/vder-nyreplacement-net-metering/.
168
169
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to all market participants.”176 VDER seeks to do this by “creat[ing]
different values for the electric system [used], and impose different costs
on the electric system, depending on its individual characteristics and the
nature of its use, including when and where the [distributed energy
resource] is operated.”177 The new approach itself attempts to value
distributed generation by including value for “reduced energy
consumption, energy generation, green energy attributes . . . , capacity,
reduced system stress, displacement of the need for traditional grid
infrastructure, increased reliability, load shifting, demand response, peak
load reduction, voltage support, frequency management and reactive
power.”178 This new system is undoubtedly one of the most in-depth and
nuanced compromises between pro-renewable advocates, utility
companies, and non-distributed generation customers.
Under the VDER model, net metering installations installed pre2017 VDER implementation were grandfathered in.179 Second, two
components were implemented in the post-2017 “phase one” period.180
The pre-existing net metering compensation shceme will cover phase one
net metering, including new distributed generation installations between
March 9, 2017, and January 1, 2020, albeit with a twenty-year contract
cap.181 The second component is the “Value Stack” tariff.182 This tariff is
based on monetary crediting for net hourly injections and will receive
compensation for a term of twenty-five years.183 It also applies specifically
to certain defined system types, namely community distributed
generators.184 Furthermore, the tariff modifies compensation for solar plus
176 In re The Value of Distributed Energy Resources, 2017 N.Y. P.U.C.
LEXIS 121, *29 (Mar. 9, 2017).
177 Id. at 30.
178 Id. at 31, 32 (“For any individual DER, [net energy metering] may
be over- or-under compensatory as compared to the actual values and costs that
resource creates.”).
179 New York Net Metering, supra note 174.
180 Id.
181 In re The Value of Distributed Energy Resources, supra note 176, at
6.
182 Id. at 23–24.
183 Id.
184 See John Farrell, Is New York’s Compromise the Future for Net
Metering?, RENEWABLE ENERGY WORLD (Mar. 7, 2017),
https://www.renewableenergyworld.com/ugc/articles/2017/03/06/is-new-yorkscompromise-the-future-for-net-metering.html. The new law has all but closed
the market to new implementation of community distributed generation projects.
Id. The new law reduces the required compensation amount from utilities to
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storage generators by lowering the compensation when energy is fed back
to the grid from a storage site, depending on the size of the generation
system.185 As it stands, New York’s regulatory approach to net metering
will be a system on which to keep an eye, especially if future legislators
seek to make a compromise in net metering policies for all parties affected.
IV.

SECTION IV

If any picture can be painted from the survey of the net metering
regulatory landscape, it is the disunity of policies across the United States.
The constantly shifting landscape produced a hodgepodge of solar
adoption rates across the states, spurned both residential and commercial
investors in the solar energy field nationwide, produced disparity in legal
treatment between early adopters and newcomers, and did little to truly
alter the centralized IOU/MU model that dominates energy distribution.
(A) The Effect on Investors - Uncertainty
Studies show that net metering is the most utilized state inventive
for renewable power nationwide.186 The shifting landscape regarding net
metering poses a risk to both current and future investors in the solar
field.187 With seven years of data to work with since the utility lobby has
both successfully and unsuccessfully lobbied to reduce net metering
compensation schemes, there is evidence across all fifty states of the risk
posed to solar investors.188 Nevada’s 2015 compensation scheme189 is
perhaps one of the starkest examples of the effects a shifting regulatory
scheme can have on investors. From the implementation of the scheme in
2015, Nevada lost one-third of all solar jobs in a year and a half period.190
community but requires that the community projects to still pay full retail to the
consumer. Id.
185 In re The Value of Distributed Energy Resources, supra note 176, at
72–73.
186 Net Metering Map, DSIRE (Oct. 2012),
http://www.disreusa.org/documents/summarymaps/net_metering_map.pdf; Net
Metering Map, DSIRE (Apr. 2019), https://s3.amazonaws.com/ncsolarcenprod/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/DSIRE_Net_Metering_April2019.pdf.
187 Dan Gearino, What Should the Future of Net Metering Look Like?,
INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (June 11, 2019),
https://insideclimatenews.org/news/11062019/rooftop-solar-net-metering-ratesrenewable-energy-homeowners-utility-state-law-changes-map.
188 Id.
189 See supra (J) Nevada.
190 See Spiegel, supra note 162.
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SolarCity and Sunrun, Nevada’s two largest solar operations, both
announced they were leaving the state soon after the 2015 scheme was
introduced.191 However, while risk from an operational standpoint is
always associated with regulation, the regulatory posture drastically
affects the average consumer, as well. First, from a pure investment
standpoint, anti-net metering policies put downward pressure on solar
stocks.192 Sunrun Inc. declined from its $13.74 per share high on
December 18, 2015, to $5.04 on February 12, 2016, representing a sixtynine percent drop in share price following Nevada’s decision. 193 Second,
and more importantly for the average solar investor, was the Nevada
Public Utilities Commission’s willingness to apply its 2015 pricing
scheme retrogressively to existing solar customers.194 This drastic move
showed one of the greatest potential risks for the average consumer,
regarding a shifting regulatory climate. Not only did it negatively affect
future investments in the US from residential customers, it also affected
investor expectations that were based on previous regulatory promises.
While this net metering policy shift seems to be the exception and not the
rule,195 the mere possibility of this happening in other states that adopt proutility legislation can certainly make future solar adopters skittish about
their investment.
Additionally, uncertainty among legislatures and public utility
commissions on how to properly value the cost of distributed generation
going forward is a hinderance for future solar investments. New York
indeed established itself as the leading state considering the greatest

191 Ivan Penn, SolarCity to Leave Nevada after PUC Cuts Rooftop
Solar Benefits, LA TIMES (Dec. 23, 2015), https://www.latimes.com/business/lafi-solarcity-nevada-rooftop-20151223-story.html; David Roberts, Nevada’s
Bizarre Decision to Throttle its Own Solar Industry Explained, VOX (Jan. 20,
2016), https://www.vox.com/2016/1/20/10793732/nevada-solar-industryexplained.
192 Attacks on Renewable Energy and Net Metering Policies, ENERGY
& POL’Y INSTITUTE (May 2014),
https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/energyandpolicy/pages/99/attachments/o
riginal/1400726723/Report-State-Renewable-Energy-Attacks-by-Fossil-FuelFront-Groups.pdf?1400726723.
193 See infra Appendix C, at 47.
194 See Dickinson, supra note 34.
195 See supra Section IV (showing that all other states discussed
maintained a permanent or declining grandfather clause for established
residential distribution generation).
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variable of metrics regarding the cost of solar.196 And yet, the New York
VDER model has quite created one of the most complex regulatory fields
for future investments, also standing out as the exception rather than the
rule.
The more standard rule is that states are split among a dichotomy,
with net meter rates determined by public utility commissions that favor
either solar advocates or the utility industry.197 And with these rates
constantly changing and under review,198 intense pressure is placed upon
solar businesses in creating an effective strategy for solar investments.
(B) Lack of Judicial Resource
The effect around uncertainty in rate changing is only exacerbated when
investors realize that there is little recourse to federal judicial review to
challenge rates that are either mildly biased towards favoring net metering,
or blatantly so. This is because The Johnson Act largely barred federal
courts from interfering with state administrative agencies and their
subdivisions regarding rate-making decision. 199
Moreover, since the seminal decision in Federal Power
Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co.,200 the Supreme Court adopted a
level of deference to utility rate pricing by utility regulators and takings
clause violations.201 In Hope Natural Gas, the Court considered a rate
order issued by the Federal Power Commission which reduced rates
chargeable by the utility company Hope Natural Gas.202 In considering the
challenge that the mandated rate did not adequately address the utility
company’s needs, the Court stated that it “cannot say they are
[inadequate], unless we are to substitute our opinions for the expert
judgment of the administrators to whom Congress entrusted the
decision.”203 To do so otherwise would insert into the congressionally
mandated rate charging authority that public utility commissions possess
See supra(L)New York.
See generally supra Section III.
198 Id.
199 See 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (2018) (“The district courts shall not enjoin,
suspend or restrain the operation of, or compliance with, any order affecting
rates chargeable by a public utility and made by a State Administrative agency
or a rate-making body of a State political subdivision.”).
200 Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
201 Megan Mclean, Throwing Shade: The Case Against Judicial
Interference with Solar Net Metering Policies, 46 Eɴᴠᴛʟ. L. Rᴇᴘ. 10873, 10876
(2016).
202 Id. (citing Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. at 615).
203 Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. at 615.
196
197
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a “novel doctrine which has no express statutory sanction.” 204 As such, the
Supreme Court noted that an agency’s rate order is “the product of expert
judgment which carries a presumption of validity,” and “he who would
upset the rate order under the Act carries the heavy burden of making a
convincing showing that it is invalid because it is unjust and unreasonable
in its consequences.”205 This decision largely freed courts from oversight
of a public utility commission’s utility pricing mechanisms and shifted
judicial oversight to examining the reasonableness of the resulting rate.206
This holding largely extended to state court decisions, as well.207
Ultimately, this jurisprudence now cuts both ways, and it should208 largely
bar distributed generators from challenging their own compensation
schemes under new net metering regulations.
Therefore, going forward, uncertainty in the face of future
regulations presents the largest challenge for solar adoption nationwide.
Accurately structuring business strategies is immensely complicated and
costly when faced with a shifting regulatory landscape. In some cases, a
regulatory shift can be so drastic as to result in the immediate winding
down of current operations in a state or it causes delays in starting
operations in another. This uncertainty is not only limited to net metering
regulations, but also to solar-storage regulations,209 and continues to bar
Id. at 616.
Id. at 602.
206 See Peskoe, supra note 33, at 230.
207 Id. at 233 (first citing Office of Consumer Counsel v. Dep't of Pub.
Util. Control, 905. A.2d 1, 6 (Conn. 2006) (“In the specialized context of a rate
case, the court may not substitute its own balance of the regulatory
considerations for that of the agency, and must assure itself that the [department]
has given reasoned consideration to the factors expressed in [the statute].”); then
citing Iowa-Ill. Gas & Electric Co. v. Ill. Commerce Comm'n, 19 Ill. 2d 436,
442 (Ill. 1960) (Deference to the Commission is “especially appropriate in the
area of fixing rates.”); then citing Farmland Ind., Inc. v. Kan. Corp. Comm'n, 37
P.3d 640, 650 (Kan. App. 2001) (The Kansas Corporation Commission “has
broad discretion in making decisions in rate design types of issues.”); then citing
Ohio Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 926 N.E.2d 261, 266 (Ohio
2010) (upholding SFV natural gas rate design) (“The lack of a governing statute
telling the commission how it must design rates vests the commission with
broad discretion in this area.”); and then citing Application of Ark. La. Gas Co.,
558 P.2d 376, 377 (Okla. 1976) (“The establishment of rates and the
apportionment thereof among various groups of customers is a legislative
function of the Commission.”]).
208 But see infra Section V (A).
209 See infra (B) Progressing towards Solar-plus-Storage adoption.
204
205
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mass solar adoption so long as the uncertainty remains. Thus, the focus
going forward needs to be on establishing a semblance of stability in a
market that is anything but stable.
V.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE SOLAR INDUSTRY GOING
FORWARD
The shift in the net metering regulatory landscape is indeed
laudable for most parties concerned. New rate models and net metering
compensation schemes are seeking innovative ways to accurately take
utility industry, solar, and non-solar customer concerns into account.
However, while New York offered the most comprehensive model yet
towards this goal, other states continue to balk at supporting distributed
generation which is undermining the progress toward adoption of
renewable energy rates nationwide. Thus, these states and certain proutility net metering laws are the initial focus of this next section.
(A) A Takings Clause Challenge to the Buy All/Sell All
Compensation Scheme
Connecticut, Maine, and Nevada’s net metering compensation
schemes have presented the greatest threat to both net metering’s progress
nationwide and to in-state solar investments. First, recall that the buy
all/sell all model, enacted in all three states, forces all distributed
generators to sell all their electricity to the utility company at the wholesale
rate and then buy back what is needed for their energy consumption at the
utility retail sales rate. I propose that this net metering scheme be
challenged as an illegal taking of a distributed generator’s property in
violation of the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution. 210
The Takings Clause of the United States Constitution commands
simply, “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.” The application of this clause to challenging utility rates
is no stranger to the field of utility rate pricing, albeit it has almost
uniformly been used by utility companies in its history. In fact, in the case
of Takings Clause challenges to utility regulation and pricing, the Supreme
Court developed a distinct line of jurisprudence.211 The Federal Power
Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co. 212 decision, discussed supra,
provided guidance for a Takings Clause challenge in the context of utility
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
See McLean, supra note 201, at 10875.
212 Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
210
211
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rate pricing. In Hope Natural Gas, the Supreme Court adopted its
deferential approach to utility rate pricing by articulating an “end results”
test.213 Under this test, the Court made clear that rates that enable a
company to operate successfully, maintain its financial integrity, attract
capital, and compensate its investors cannot be condemned as invalid.214
This created a presumption of validity concerning rate-making that cannot
be successfully challenged without convincingly showing that a rate is
unjust or unreasonable.215 The Supreme Court reaffirmed this test in
Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch in 1989, which upheld a Pennsylvania law
that prohibited consideration of utilities’ stranded costs into the utility rate
formulation.216 The Supreme Court grounded its decision in the fact of a
loss of revenue of $35 million for Dusquesne Light Company because of
its stranded costs, which amounted to two percent of the utility’s base and
only reduced the utility’s annual allowance by two-fifths percent and did
not “jeopardize the financial integrity of the companies, either by leaving
them insufficient operating capital or by impeding their ability to raise
future capital… [and it did not show] that these rates are inadequate to
compensate current equity holders from the risk associated with their
investments under a modified prudent investment scheme.”217
This decision laid the ground work for a successful challenge to
net metering, for utility companies now know they must put forth an
argument that net metering leaves utility companies with stranded costs
that do meet the threshold of “jeopardiz[ing] the financial integrity” of the
utility companies, which amounts to a constitutional taking.218 However,
irony has it that Hope Natural Gas and Dusquesne provide the ammunition
needed to overturn a buy all/sell all net metering scheme by a challenge
originating from the distributed generator.
As stipulated, a showing must be made that a rate is unjust or
unreasonable to be successful. And the Supreme Court impliedly
articulated that one way to meet this burden is to show a rate- making
jeopardizes the financial integrity of a company or by providing rates
inadequate to compensate equity holders. Here, with evidence that
emerged out of Nevada and Maine and which can be applied to
Connecticut going forward, it is clear that a buy all/sell all program is
Id.
See McLean, supra note 201, at 10876 (citing 320 U.S. at 605).
215 Id. (citing 320 U.S. at 615).
216 Id. at 10877 (citing Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299,
301 (1989)).
217 Dusquesne Light Co., 488 U.S. at 312.
218 See McLean, supra note 201, at 10877.
213
214
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indeed unjust and unreasonable when asserted from the perspective of
distributed generators. The buy all/sell all model in Connecticut seeks to
shift net metering compensation that was historically granted at retail rates
to the wholesale rate, which the Public Utilities Regulatory Authority will
determine. The effect of this in Nevada was clear in that it cannot
adequately compensate future solar investments and prevents third-party
investors from reaching profitable margins. The fact is, the wholesale rate
compensation package cannot give a return to match the initial investment
costs made into solar installation, let alone have the investment reach a
level of profitability.
Utility companies do have a viable defense in distinguishing that
the line of Takings Clause cases under Hope Natural Gas and Dusquesne
applies only to utility monopolies and that new distributed generators
cannot rely upon such precedent. However, that leads to the possibility for
distributed generator’s to make a Takings Clause claim under the
traditional land use context. In the land use context, the Supreme Court
addressed what constitutes an invalid taking by applying a multi-factored
ad hoc balancing test.219 In Pennsylvania Central Transportation, the
Supreme court enumerated three factors to be considers: [1] “the economic
impact of the regulation on the claim[,]” [2] “the extent to which a
regulation has interfered with distinct investment backed expectations,”
and [3] “the character of the governmental action.”220 As the test stands
today, the economic impact of the regulation needs to “substantially
exceed 50%” and be closer to ninety percent of the property diminished. 221
The “distinct investment backed expectations” was modified to an
interference with a “reasonable investment-backed expectations”222 and
the character of governmental action was clarified to include a regulation
that interferes with an existing use of property.223 While this test was
intended for a traditional land taking, it extended to the taking of personal
property as well.224
Pleading a case under the Penn. Central inquiry has merit. First,
the buy all/sell all regulation is mandated by the government and is a
regulation that distinctly interferes with the use of property. Second, the
Penn. Cent. Trans. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
Id.
221 See Mclean, supra note 201, at 10876 (citing [Mark W. Cordes,
Takings Jurisprudence as Three-Tiered Review, 20 J. NAT. RESOURCES &
ENVTL. L. 1, 39 (2005)]).
222 Id. (citing [Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175
(1979)]).
223 Id. (citing [Christopher Serkin, Existing Uses and the Limits of Land
Use Regulations, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1222, 1250 (2009)]).
224 Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2426 (2015).
219
220
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substantial decrease in value of the solar investment must be pled on a
case-by-case basis, but with wholesale electricity costs ranging as low as
two cents per kilowatt and retail costs raising as high as twenty-six cents
per kilowatt, legitimate arguments can be made. Third, in respect to
reasonable investment backed expectations, the owner’s expectations are
measured before the regulation instead of after the regulation, thereby
creating an objective fact-based determination based on market rather than
individual expectations.225
Providing evidence for reasonable market expectations should not
prove difficult. Solar installations are often sized either to system capacity
limit or to a proximate size that expect to offset either a portion or all of
energy consumption demand. Additionally, agreements with third-party
solar providers, either in the form of lease agreement’s or power purchase
agreements, share a uniformity across the market, and are based on
expectations of power demand based upon a set return cost for providing
that power. Furthermore, for future installers considering solar, reasonable
market expectations are set. A solar system is expected to pay off its initial
investment in anywhere from a ten to twenty-five year period. Regardless
of if that solar system produces excess power over personal demand, an
objective market expectation of any investor would be that an investor gets
first use of the product of his investment. Here the investment is the fixed
costs into installation of the solar system, and the product of the labor of
this investment is electricity. Just as a farmer of raisins has a reasonable
expectation that he can use and dispose of the fruits of his labor,226 so too
should the “farmer” of electricity be able to use and dispose of his own
product without governmental interference.227 As the buy all/sell all
225 Jonathan Houtan ET AL., The Basics of a Regulatory Taking Inverse
Condemnation Claim, ALI-CLE COURSE MATERIALS (Jan. 24–26, 2019),
https://www.ali-cle.org/search/courses-webcasts-telephone-ondemandpublicationscoursematerials/The%20Basics%20of%20a%20Regulatory%20Taking%20Inver
se%20Condemnation%20Claim.
226 Cf. Horne 135 S. Ct. at 2419–30 (considering whether a requirement
that raisin growers set aside a portion of their raisin crop to the government to
stabilize the market constituted a taking requiring just compensation, the Court
found that it was for title of the raisins were transferred to the government, and
therefore lose the entire bundle of property rights in the appropriated raisins i.e.
the right to possess, use and dispose of them).
227 But see Mclean, supra note 201, at 10878 (arguing that electricity,
or the electrons produced, is not a traditional property product such as farming
but rather a different category of goods such as oysters which are farae naturae,
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requirement forces the sale of electricity at a wholesale cost and precludes
the distributed generator’s personal use of his or her own produced
electricity before the sale, it is clear doing so interferes with the reasonable
expectations of an investment.
While challenging the buy all/sell all regime is just one small step
in the continued push toward renewable energy adoption, it poses
significant advantages to the solar industry. The Takings Clause challenge
is inherently unique to the specific buy all/sell all regulation and is not
transferrable to other forms of net metering regulation. However, it is a
weapon in the arsenal which can and should be wielded to challenge a
program that is already proven to be the ultimate “death spiral” for the
solar industry.
(B) Progressing towards Solar-plus-Storage adoption.
Another character feature of many new net metering laws is the
feed in tariff charges that regulators allow utilities to charge net metering
customers for connecting to and supplying to the grid.228 This model is
completely dependent on the current premise that the majority of
residential solar systems cannot supply 100% of consumption demands.
Most of the solar system energy is generated during daylight peak hours
when the average generator is away from the household, and most of the
energy consumption comes in the hours after work, representing the peak
energy rates. Thus, solar system generators generally roll the meter back
during the day and then push it forward at night. However, this is largely
due to many solar models needing to instantly transfer its electricity
generated directly to a source, rather than being able to store it onsite for
later use. Theoretically, the correctly installed distributed generator,
combined with a storage mechanism, can create houses, or even
communities that are 100% independent from the grid, or in the very least,
that are never needed to supply energy back to the grid, even though the
system may still need to pull from the grid.229
subject to the absolute control of the state, or dangerous products such as
chemicals, which require a permit to sell those products) This argument is
flawed. Oysters are farae naturae because they arise from nature, unlike
electricity which, beyond lightning strikes, is not. As well, electricity generation
does not pose the same societal risks associated with selling toxic chemicals and
substances, especially when generated on a small scale for personal use.
228 See Section III supra (A) & (G).
229 See generally David Frankel and Amy Wagner, Battery Storage:
The Next Disruptive Technology in the Power Sector, MCKINSEY & CO. (June
17, 2019), https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/sustainability/ourinsights/battery-storage-the-next-disruptive-technology-in-the-power-sector.
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However, we are not yet at this reality. Where the solar systems
improved and proliferated across the last two decades, solar storage
systems are not at the same level. Solar storage only recently started
realizing its potential as synergies with distributed generation began to
emerge.230 And while the economics are starting to catch up,231 solar-plusstorage laws are far behind. Many states indicated above have altogether
prohibited onsite solar storage.232 However, others such as Colorado are
pioneering the legislative framework around solar storage. In 2018, the
Colorado Legislature passed SB 18-009. The statute states:
The threat of interruptions in electric supply due to
weather, malicious interference, or malfunctions in
centralized generation and transmission facilities makes
distributed resources, including energy storage systems
paired with other distributed resources, an effective way
for residents to provide their own reliable and efficient
supply of electricity. . . [Therefore] Colorado's consumers
of electricity have a right to install, interconnect, and use
energy storage systems on their property without the
burden of unnecessary restrictions or regulations and
without unfair or discriminatory rates or fees.233
As one of the most progressive energy storage laws in the country,
Colorado’s agenda plans for that point when a breakthrough is finally
made in commercial on-site energy storage.234

230 See Emily Fisher, Energy Storage for Solar Systems Will be an
$8Billion Market in 2026, LUX RES. INC. (Jan. 28, 2016),
http://www.luxresearchinc.com/news-and-events/press-releases/read/energystorage-solar-systems-will-be-8-billion-market-2026 (coining the term as
‘partial grid deflection’ and leading consulting firm McKinsey & Co. is betting
that this will become the latest disruptor to the energy market).
231 See Frankel & Wagner, supra note 229 (“[B]attery-pack costs are
down to less than $230 per kilowatt-hour in 2016, compared with almost $1,000
per kilowatt-hour in 2010.”).
232 See Section III supra (G)Florida; see also states that have mandated
a buy all/sell all program thereby indirectly prohibiting on site solar ).
233 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-130(1)(a)(II), (1)(b)(II) (West
2018).
234 See Aundene Szmolyan, The Age of Abundance: Revelation of
Reality, or Revolution of Green?, ENVIROLINE (Feb. 6, 2018),
http://www.envirolinenews.ca/news-analysis/news/2018/02/06/the-age-of-
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However, recommending that all states adopt a similar energy
storage statute would be as successful as asking all states to adopt a
uniform set of net metering policies that compensated distributed
generation at the retail rate; the same concerns that affect the utility lobby
regarding net metering235 also affect energy storage systems. That is not to
say that Colorado’s legislation should not be a model for future solarstorage legislation. Undoubtedly it should be, at least if you are a pro solar
advocate.
Pro-solar storage regulations can also help offset net metering
regulations that shifted away from retail compensation schemes to timeof-use compensation schemes.236 As recalled from Section IV(B) supra, a
time-of-use regulation reduces the return on investment because it
compensates for solar electricity when demand for energy is at its lowest,
and then charges for consumption at the time when the rates are highest,
rather than compensating at a set retail parity pricing. The allowance for
the installation of solar-storage systems where time of use regulations are
in place allows distributed generators to bank their own generation on site
during the day in order to be utilized in the evening.
CONCLUSION
The solar industry, much like the utility industry, enjoyed rapid
growth due in large part to regulatory policies designed to further
implementation. However, the last decade proved challenging for solar as
numerous tax incentives and credits are winding down, parity pricing net
metering regulation is transforming into new regulatory schemes, and
IOUs are pouring millions of dollars into anti solar campaigns. Solarstorage presents the greatest solution for a true, large scale breakthrough
of distributed generation in the United States, but that industry too is soon
to come under immense pressure. If we seek to truly modernize our
electricity consumption and usher in a new paradigm to replace the utility
model built by Thomas Edison over 100 years ago, it will take a
coordinated effort on behalf of state legislatures across the country to bring
a level of certainty to a market that has anything but.

abundance-revelation-of-reality-or-revolution-of-green/ (of all panels at The
Economist’s 2017 Annual Energy Summit, the singular agreed upon point is that
for successful widespread progress towards a green energy future requires a
breakthrough in energy storage).
235 See generally supra Section II.
236 See Section III, supra (B).
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Figure 4. Schematic of Net Energy Metering
(Source: NREL, 2017)
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